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We introduce a general framework that is based on distance semantics and investigate the main properties of the entail-
ment relations that it induces. It is shown that such entailments are particularly useful for non-monotonic reasoning and
for drawing rational conclusions from incomplete and inconsistent information. Some applications are considered in the
context of belief revision, information integration systems, and consistent query answering for possibly inconsistent
databases.
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Reasoning with distance functions is a common way of giving semantics to formalisms that handle incom-
plete and/or inconsistent information. The basic intuition behind this approach is that, given a set of possible
worlds (alternatively, interpretations) that represent the reasoner’s epistemic states or the information content
of diﬀerent data-sources, the similarity between those worlds can be expressed quantitatively (that is, in terms
of distance measurements), and thus can be evaluated by corresponding distance operators. In this respect,
there is no wonder that distance semantics has played a prominent role in diﬀerent paradigms for information
processing. Three remarkable examples for this are the following:
• Formalisms for modelling belief revision, in which distance minimization corresponds to the idea that the
diﬀerence between the reasoner’s new state of belief and the old one should be kept as minimal as possible,
that is, restricted only to what is really implied by the new information (see, e.g., [26,29,36,46,50,59]).
• Database integration systems [3,4,10,31,35,47] and merging operators for independent data-sources [40,41],
where the basic idea is that the amalgamated information should be kept coherent and at the same time as
close as possible to the collective information as it is depicted by the distributed sources.
• Diﬀerent aspects of social choice theory, in which distance-based considerations are involved. This includes
group decision making [43], preference representation [44], and judgment aggregation [30,51].0888-613X/$ - see front matter  2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ijar.2007.07.002
E-mail address: oarieli@mta.ac.il
URL: http://www2.mta.ac.il/~oarieli
O. Arieli / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 48 (2008) 766–783 767The goal of this paper is to introduce similar distance considerations in the context of paraconsistent
logics, that is: formalisms that tolerate inconsistency and do not become trivial in the presence of con-
tradictions.1 One could identify at least four parties with diﬀerent philosophical attitudes to such logics:
the traditionalists defend classical logics and deny any need of paraconsistent logics. On the other extreme,
the dialetheists contend that the world is fundamentally inconsistent and hence the true logic should be
paraconsistent. The pluralists view inconsistent structures as fundamental but provisional, and favour their
replacement, at least in empirical domains, by consistent counterparts. Finally, the reformists defend con-
sistency in ontological matters, but argue that human knowledge and thinking necessarily requires incon-
sistency, and hence that classical logic should be replaced by a paraconsistent counterpart. The underlying
theme here, following the reformists, is that conﬂicting data is unavoidable in practice, but it corresponds
to inadequate information about the real world, and therefore it should be minimized. As we show below,
this intuition is nicely and easily expressed in terms of distance semantics.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in the next section we introduce the framework and the
family of distance-based entailments that it induces. Then, in Section 3 we consider some basic properties
of these entailments and in Section 4 we discuss their applications in relevant areas, such as operators for
belief revision and consistent query answering in database systems. In Section 5 we examine extensions to
the multiple-valued case and the incorporation of corresponding distance functions. In Section 6 we
conclude.2. Distance-based semantics and entailments
The intuition behind our approach is very simple. Suppose, for instance, that a certain set of assumptions C
consists only of two facts p and q. In this case it seems reasonable to use the classical entailment for inferring
the formulas in the transitive closure of C. If we learn now that :p also holds, classical logic becomes useless,
as everything classically follows from C0 ¼ C [ f:pg. The decision how to maintain the inconsistent fragment
of C 0 depends on the underlying formalism. For example, most of the belief revision operators prefer more
recent information thus conclude :p and exclude p in this case. Alternatively, many merging operators that
view C and f:pg as belief bases of two diﬀerent sources will retract both p and :p, and so forth. It is evident,
however, that :q should not follow from C 0, as there is no evidence whatsoever that q is related to any con-
tradictory information. In our context, this is captured by the fact that valuations in which q holds are ‘closer’
to C 0 (thus are more plausible) than valuations in which q is falsiﬁed. In what follows we formalize this idea.
Given a propositional language L with a ﬁnite set Atoms of atomic formulas, the space of the two-valued
interpretations on Atoms is denoted K2. In the sequel, we shall consider ﬁnite multisets of formulas inL, called
theories. Given such a theory C, the set Atoms(C) consists of the atoms that appear in the formulas of C. The
set of the models of C (i.e., the valuations m s.t. m(w) = t for every w 2 C) is denoted mod(C).
Deﬁnition 1. A total function d : U  U ! Rþ is called pseudo-distance on U if it is symmetric ("u,v 2 U
d(u,v) = d(v,u)) and preserves identity ("u,v 2 U d(u,v) = 0 iﬀ u = v). A distance function on U is a pseudo-
distance on U that satisﬁes the triangular inequality ("u,v,w 2 U d(u,v) 6 d(u,w) + d(w,v)).
Example 1. The following functions are distances on K2:
• The Hamming distance: dH2ðm; lÞ ¼ jfp 2 AtomsjmðpÞ 6¼ lðpÞgj.2
• The drastic distance: dU(m,l) = 0 if m = l and dU(m,l) = 1 otherwise.Deﬁnition 2. A numeric aggregation function f is a total function that accepts a multiset of real numbers and
returns a real number. In addition, (a) f is non-decreasing in the values of its argument,3 (b) f ðfx1; . . . ; xngÞ ¼ 0
iﬀ x1 ¼ . . . ¼ xn ¼ 0, and (c) 8x 2 R f ðfxgÞ ¼ x.1 See [23,54]. Some collections of papers on this topic appear, e.g., in [14,20].
2 That is, dH2 ðm; lÞ is the number of atoms p such that m(p)5 l(p). This function is also known as the Dalal distance [24].
3 That is, the function value is non-decreasing when an element in the multiset is replaced by a larger element.
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meet the conditions in Deﬁnition 2 are, e.g., a summation or an average of distances (for mean case analysis),
the maximal value among distances (which yields a worst case analysis), and so forth.
Deﬁnition 3. Given a theory C ¼ fw1; . . . ;wng, a two-valued interpretation m 2 K2, a pseudo-distance d on K2,
and an aggregation function f, deﬁne the following function on K2 L:44 As
denote
5 Bel
d(m,w)
6 Th
valueddðm;wÞ ¼ minfdðm; lÞjl 2 modðfwgÞg:5Accordingly, the function dd,f is deﬁned as follows:dd;f ðm;CÞ ¼ f ðfdðm;w1Þ; . . . ; dðm;wnÞgÞ:
The next deﬁnition captures the intuition behind distance semantics that the relevant interpretations of a
theory C are those that are dd,f-closest to C.
Deﬁnition 4. The most plausible valuations of C (with respect to a pseudo-distance d and an aggregation
function f) are the valuations m that belong to the following set:D2d;f ðCÞ ¼ fm 2 K2j8l 2 K2 dd;f ðm;CÞ 6 dd;f ðl;CÞg:6Note 1. The distance-like function dd,f in Deﬁnition 3 is not invariant with respect to the notion of logical
equivalence. Yet, according to Deﬁnition 4, consistent theories that are logically equivalent share the same
most plausible models (cf. Proposition 1 below). Inconsistent theories, on the other hand, are all logically
equivalent, so any deﬁnition of most plausible models that makes a distinction among such theories cannot
preserve logical equivalence. Rather, it should employ some more delicate considerations.
Consider, for instance the theories C1 ¼ fp;:pg, C2 ¼ fp; p;:pg, and two valuations mt,mf 2 K2, for which
mt(p) = t and mf(p) = f. Then, when f is the summation or the average function, D
2
d;f ðC1Þ ¼ fmt; mfg, while
D2d;f ðC2Þ ¼ fmtg. This captures the intuition that while C1 is totally symmetric, C2 contains more quantitative
evidence for p than for :p (which is a kind of a ‘majority vote consideration’ for resolving contradictions; see
[41,47] and Section 4.3 below).
Corresponding consequence relations are now deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 5. For a pseudo-distance d and an aggregation function f, deﬁne: C2d;fw if D2d;f ðCÞ  modðfwgÞ.
That is, conclusions should follow from all the most plausible valuations of the premises.
Example 2. Let C ¼ fp; q; r;:p _ :q; r ^ sg. This theory is not consistent, and so everything classically
follows from it, including, e.g., :r. This seems to be a very strange conclusion in our case, as r is
not part of an inconsistent fragment of C, therefore it does not make sense here to conclude its
complement. Using distance-based semantics, this anomaly can be lifted. To see this, consider the table
in Fig. 1 that lists the d-distances between the relevant valuations and C according to several common
settings.
Here, D2dU ;RðCÞ ¼ D2dH2 ;RðCÞ ¼ fm1; m5; m9g, thus C2dU ;Rr and C2dH2 ;Rr, while C22dU ;R:r and C22dH2 ;R:r. The
same thing happens with s, as intuitively expected. Note also that the atoms p, q that are involved in the
inconsistency are not deducible from C, nor their complements. The entailment 2
dH2 ;max
is more cautious; it
does not allow to infer neither r nor :r (and similarly neither s nor :s is deducible), but the weaker conclusion
r _ s is deducible.usual, we identify the languageL with its set of formulas. Also, to reduce the amount of notations, we use the same symbol (d) to
the pseudo-distance on K2 and the induced distance-like function on K2 L. The exact meaning of d will be clear from the context.
ow, we exclude classical contradictions in the premises. Alternatively, if w is a contradiction, one may set, for every m 2 K2,
= jAtomsj.
e superscript ‘2’ denotes the standard two-valued semantics. This indication will be useful in Section 5, where we consider multiple-
structures.
Fig. 1. Interpretations for C (Example 2) and their d-distances from C.
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The principle of uncertainty minimization by distance semantics, depicted in Deﬁnition 5, is in fact a pref-
erence criterion among diﬀerent interpretations of the premises. In this respect, the formalisms that are deﬁned
here may be considered as a certain kind of preferential logics [48,49,57,58], as only ‘preferred’ valuations
(those that are ‘as close as possible’ to the premises) are taken into consideration for drawing conclusions from
the premises.
When a theory is classically consistent, its set of models is not empty, so it seems natural to choose these
valuations as the preferred (i.e., most plausible) ones. The following proposition shows that the models of a
theory C are indeed closest to C.
Proposition 1. Let C be a consistent theory. For every pseudo-distance d and aggregation function f,
D2d;f ðCÞ ¼ modðCÞ.7
Proof. Let C = {w1, . . . ,wn}. If m is a model of C, then d(m,wi) = 0 for every 1 6 i 6 n, and so dd,f(m,C) = 0 as
well. Now, since for every valuation l, dd,f(l,C)P 0, necessarily m 2 D2d;f ðCÞ.
For the converse, suppose that m is not a model of C. Then m does not satisfy wj for some 1 6 j 6 n, and so
d(m,wj) > 0. Now, by conditions (a) and (b) in Deﬁnition 2, f is strictly positive whenever it has at least one
strictly positive argument and the other arguments are non-negative. We have, then, that dd,f(m,C) > 0. On the
other hand, as mod(C)5 ; there is a model l of C, for which dd,f(l,C) = 0. It follows, then, that
m 62 D2d;f ðCÞ. h
Denote by 2 the standard entailment of classical logic (that is, C2w if every model of C satisﬁes w). Then:
Corollary 1. For every classically consistent theory C and for every formula w, C2w iff C2d;fw.
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 1. h
A characteristic property of distance-based entailments is that they are paraconsistent [23,54], namely:
unlike classical entailment, contradictory premises do not entail everything (thus they do not have an explosive
character):
Proposition 2. For every pseudo-distance d and aggregation function f, 2d;f is paraconsistent.
Proof. Follows from the fact that for every theory C, D2d;f ðCÞ 6¼ ; (as the minimal dd,f-distance from C over a
ﬁnite space of interpretations is always obtained). Thus, for every formula w such that there exists a valuation
m 2 D2d;f ðCÞ for which m(w) = f, it holds that C22d;fw. h7 Clearly, the converse is also true: if C is not consistent then D2d;f ðCÞ 6¼ modðCÞ, since mod(C) = ; while D2d;f ðCÞ 6¼ ;.
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is always consistent:
Proposition 3. For every pseudo-distance d, aggregation function f, theory C and formula w, we have that if
C2d;fw then C22d;f:w.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that there is a formula w such that C2d;fw and C2d;f:w at the same time.
Then D2d;f ðCÞ  modðfwgÞ and D2d;f ðCÞ  modðf:wgÞ. Thus, D2d;f ðCÞ  modðfwgÞ \modðf:wgÞ ¼ ;, a contra-
diction to the fact that for every C, D2d;f ðCÞ 6¼ ; (see the proof of Proposition 2). h
Corollary 1 and Proposition 2 (or Proposition 3) imply the following desirable property of 2d;f :
Corollary 2. For every pseudo-distance d and aggregation function f, 2d;f is the same as the classical entailment
with respect to consistent premises, and is non-trivial otherwise.
For the next propositions we concentrate on unbiased distances:
Deﬁnition 6. A (pseudo) distance d is called unbiased, if for every formula w and interpretations m1,m2 2 K2 so
that m1(p) = m2(p) for every p 2 Atoms({w}), it holds that d(m1,w) = d(m2,w).
The last property assures that, given a pseudo-distance on K2, the distance-like function that it induces on
K2 L depends only on the atoms that appear in the formula, and so this function is not ‘biased’ by irrelevant
atoms. Note, e.g., that the distances in Example 1 are unbiased.
Unbiasedness will be useful in what follows for assuring some desirable properties of the distance-based
consequence relations. First, we consider a useful condition for unbiasedness, speciﬁed in terms of (pseudo)
distances on K2:
Deﬁnition 7. An (unnormalized) fuzzy measure [44] on a ﬁnite set S is a mapping F : 2S ! Rþ, such that
Fð;Þ ¼ 0, and for every A;B  S if A  B then FðAÞ 6FðBÞ.8
Proposition 4. A pseudo-distance d on K2 is unbiased, if for all m1,m2 2 K2 it holds that dðm1; m2Þ ¼FðDiffðm1; m2ÞÞ,
where F is a fuzzy measure on Atoms and Diffðm1; m2Þ ¼ fp 2 Atomsjm1ðpÞ 6¼ m2ðpÞg.
Proof. Given a formula w in L and two valuations m1,m2 2 K2 such that for every p 2 Atoms({w}) m1(p) =
m2(p), we shall show that d(m1,w) = d(m2,w). Indeed, let lmin1 2 modðfwgÞ be a valuation so that
8l 2 modðfwgÞ dðm1; lmin1 Þ 6 dðm1;lÞ and lmin2 2 modðfwgÞ a valuation so that 8l 2
modðfwgÞ dðm2; lmin2 Þ 6 dðm2; lÞ. Consider also the valuations l1,l2 2 K2, deﬁned for every p 2 Atoms as
follows:8 No
unnorml1ðpÞ ¼
lmin1 ðpÞ if p 2 AtomsðfwgÞ;
m1ðpÞ if p 62 AtomsðfwgÞ;
andl2ðpÞ ¼
lmin1 ðpÞ if p 2 AtomsðfwgÞ;
m2ðpÞ if p 62 AtomsðfwgÞ:
Now, as l1 and lmin1 are identical on Atoms({w}), we have that l1 2 mod({w}), thus FðDiffðm1; lmin1 ÞÞ ¼
dðm1; lmin1 Þ 6 dðm1; l1Þ ¼FðDiffðm1; l1ÞÞ. On the other hand, by the deﬁnitions of these interpretations,
Diffðm1; l1Þ  Diffðm1; lmin1 Þ and asF is a fuzzy measure,FðDiffðm1; l1ÞÞ 6FðDiffðm1;lmin1 ÞÞ. Combining these
two facts we have, therefore, thatFðDiffðm1; l1ÞÞ ¼FðDiffðm1; lmin1 ÞÞ. Denote now by m#S the restriction of m to
the atomic formulas in S. Then, by the considerations above, we have:rmalized fuzzy measures are obtained by setting their range to the unit interval and requiring thatFðSÞ ¼ 1. As in [44], we ﬁnd the
alized version of this concept more convenient.
9 Th
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¼FðDiffðm1; lmin1 ÞÞ ¼FðDiffðm1; l1ÞÞ
¼FðDiffðm#AtomsðfwgÞ1 ; l#AtomsðfwgÞ1 ÞÞ
¼FðDiffðm#AtomsðfwgÞ2 ; l#AtomsðfwgÞ1 ÞÞ
¼FðDiffðm#AtomsðfwgÞ2 ; l#AtomsðfwgÞ2 ÞÞ
¼FðDiffðm2; l2ÞÞ ¼ dðm2; l2Þ
P dðm2; lmin2 Þ ¼ dðm2;wÞ:Similarly, by symmetric considerations, d(m2,w)P d(m1,w). Thus, d(m1,w) = d(m2,w). h
Unbiasedness allows us to strengthen Proposition 2, as in this case a non-tautological formula never follows
from a theory unless they share propositional atoms.
Proposition 5. Let d be an unbiased pseudo-distance and f an aggregation function. Suppose that C is a theory in
L and w is a non-tautological formula in L such that Atoms(C) \ Atoms({w}) = ;. Then C22d;fw.
Proof. Let C = {w1, . . . ,wn} and m 2 D2d ;f ðCÞ. If m(w) = f we are done. Otherwise, consider a valuation l that is
the same as m on Atoms(C) and l(w) = f. Such a valuation exists, of-course, since w is not a tautology, the value
of l(w) depends only on the assignments of l on Atoms({w}), and Atoms(C) \ Atoms({w}) = ;. Now, as d is
unbiased, d(m,wi) = d(l,wi) for every wi 2 C, thus dd,f(m,C) = dd,f(l,C), and so l 2 D2d;f ðCÞ as well. Hence,
C22d;fw. h
Note 2. Unbiasedness of the pseudo-distance is indeed a necessary condition for assuring Proposition 5. To
see this, consider the following function on K2:dUq ðm; lÞ ¼
0 if m ¼ l;
1 if m 6¼ l and mðqÞ ¼ lðqÞ ¼ t;
5 otherwise:
8><
>:Clearly, dUq is a (biased) pseudo-distance on K
2, and fp;:pg2
dUq ;R
q.
Another characteristic property of 2d;f is its non-monotonic nature. According to 2d;f , a formula that is
entailed by a certain theory C might not necessarily be a consequence of a superset of C (cf. monotonicity
in Deﬁnition 9).9
Proposition 6. For every pseudo-distance d and aggregation function f, 2d;f is non-monotonic.
Proof. By Corollary 1, p2d;f p and :p2d;f:p. By Proposition 3, on the other hand, either p;:p22d;f p or
p;:p22d;f:p (or both). Hence, the set of conclusions does not monotonically grow with respect to the size
of the premises, and so 2d;f is non-monotonic. h
Next we show that in many cases non-monotonicity goes along with rationality [45], that is: a reasoner does
not have to retract any previous conclusion when learning about a new fact that has no inﬂuence on the pre-
mises. Borrowing the example in [45], suppose that we know that a certain bird b can ﬂy, and then we learn
that b is a red bird. As the color of a bird should not aﬀect its ﬂying ability, we still want to retain our previous
conclusion that b can ﬂy.
Note 3. It is important to note that we are using here the notion of rationality in the particular sense
mentioned above, which is one of the requirements for ‘rational closure’ in the sense of Lehmann and Magidor
(see [45]). Note, also, that our terminology should not be confused with the notion of rationality in the
literature of non-monotonic reasoning, which is concerned with the satisfaction of the rationality postulate.is corresponds to the fact that humans tend to change their mind in light of new information that contradicts previous conclusion(s).
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f({x1, . . . ,xn,z1, . . . ,zm}) < f({y1, . . . ,yn,z1, . . . ,zm}).
Remark that hereditary, unlike monotonicity, is deﬁned by strict inequalities. Thus, for instance, summa-
tion of distances is hereditary (as distances are non-negative), while the maximum function is not.
Proposition 7. Let d be an unbiased pseudo-distance and f a hereditary aggregation function. If C2d;fw then
C;/2d;fw for every formula / such that Atoms(C [ {w}) \ Atoms({/}) = ;.
Intuitively, the condition on / in Proposition 7 guarantees that / is ‘irrelevant’ for C and w. The intuitive
meaning of Proposition 7 is, therefore, that the reasoner does not have to retract w when learning that / holds.
Proof of Proposition 7. If w is a tautology then the proposition obviously holds. Otherwise, let l be a valuation
such that l(w) = f. As C2d;fw, necessarily l 62 D2d;f ðCÞ, and so there is a valuation m 2 D2d;f ðCÞ for which
dd,f(m,C) < dd,f(l,C). Now, assuming that C = {w1, . . . ,wn}, we have that f({d(m,w1), . . . ,d(m,wn)}) <
f({d(l,w1), . . . ,d(l,wn)}). Again, C2d;fw implies that m(w) = t. Now, consider a valuation r, deﬁned as follows:rðpÞ ¼ mðpÞ if p 2 AtomsðC [ fwgÞ;
lðpÞ otherwise:
Note that r(p) = m(p) for every p 2 Atoms({w}), and so r(w) = t as well. Also, asAtoms(C [ {w}) \ Atoms({/})
= ;, r(p) = l(p) for every p 2 Atoms({/}), thus r(/) = l(/). Now, since d is unbiased and f is hereditary, we have
thatdd;f ðr;C [ f/gÞ ¼ f ðfdðr;w1Þ; . . . ; dðr;wnÞ; dðr;/ÞgÞ
¼ f ðfdðm;w1Þ; . . . ; dðm;wnÞ; dðl;/ÞgÞ
< f ðfdðl;w1Þ; . . . ; dðl;wnÞ; dðl;/ÞgÞ
¼ dd;f ðl;C [ f/gÞ:Thus, for every valuation l such that l(w) = f there is a valuation r such that r(w) = t and dd,f(r,C [ {/})
< dd,f(l,C [ {/}). It follows that the elements of D2d;f ðC [ f/gÞ must satisfy w, and so C;/2d;fw. h
Note that Proposition 7 holds, in particular, when C is not consistent. If consistency is assumed, a more
general result is obtained:
Proposition 8. Let d be a pseudo-distance and f an aggregation function. If C2d;fw and C [ {/} is consistent,
then C;/2d;fw.
Proof. If C [ {/} is consistent, then so is C. Thus, by Corollary 1, C2d;fw implies that C2w, which implies
that C,/ 2 w, and so (Corollary 1 again) C;/2d;fw. h
Corollary 3. Let d be a pseudo-distance and f an aggregation function. If C2d;fw and C22:/, then C;/2d;fw.
Another useful property of 2d;f is known as adaptivity [12,13]. This property is concerned with the ability to
handle contradictory theories in a non-trivial way and at the same time to presuppose a consistency of all the
formulas ‘unless and until proven otherwise’. Consequence relations with this property adapt to the speciﬁc
inconsistencies that occur in the theories. For instance, the Disjunctive Syllogism should not be applied for
concluding q from fp;:p;:p _ qg. On the other hand, in the case of fp;:p; r;:r _ qg, applying the Disjunctive
Syllogism on r and :r _ q may be justiﬁed by the fact that the subset of formulas on which the Disjunctive
Syllogism is applied is not aﬀected by the inconsistency of the whole theory, therefore inference rules that
are classically valid can be applied to it.
The following proposition shows that 2d;f is adaptive when d is unbiased and f is hereditary: if a given the-
ory can be split up to a consistent and an inconsistent parts, then every assertion that is not related to the
inconsistent part, and that classically follows from the consistent part, is entailed by the whole theory.
Proposition 9. Let d be an unbiased pseudo-distance and f a hereditary aggregation function. Suppose that C is a
theory that can be represented as C0 [ C00, where C 0 is a classically consistent theory and
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C02w then C2d;fw.
Proof. If C
02w, then by Corollary 1, C02d;fw. Now, as Atoms(C 0 [ {w}) \ Atoms(C00) = ;, we have, by Prop-
osition 7, that C2d;fw. h
Note 4. The condition on the aggregation function in Proposition 9 is indeed necessary. To see this consider,
for instance, the theory C in Example 2. This theory can be partitioned to a consistent subtheory C 0 = {r, r ^ s}
and an inconsistent subtheory C00 ¼ fp; q;:p _ :qg. Also, Atoms(C 0) \ Atoms(C00) = ;. Yet, although C 02r,
we have that C22
dH ;max
r, since max is not a hereditary function. This example also shows that the condition
in Proposition 7 on the heredity of f is necessary for assuring rationality.
Example 3. By Proposition 9, 2
dH ;R
is adaptive, while by Note 4, 2
dH ;max
is not adaptive.
We conclude this section by checking to what extent 2d;f may be considered as a consequence relation.
Deﬁnition 9. A (Tarskian) consequence relation [60] is a relation ‘ between multisets of formulae and
formulae, that satisﬁes the following conditions:
reflexivity: C ‘w for every w 2 C.
monotonicity: if C ‘w and C  C 0 then C 0‘w.
cut: if C1‘w and C2,w‘/ then C1,C2‘/.
By what we have shown so far about2d;f it is easy to see that these entailments do not satisfy any property in
Deﬁnition 9. Indeed, for any d and f, Proposition 3 shows that either p;:p22d;f p or p;:p22d;f:p, and so2d;f is not
reﬂexive, Proposition 6 shows that2d;f is not monotonic, and it is easy to see that the cut rule is violated as well:
indeed, if p;:p22d;f q, the cut rule is falsiﬁed by the facts that, by Corollary 1, p2d;f:p ! q and :p;:p ! q2d;f q;
Otherwise, if p;:p2d;f q, then by Proposition 3, p;:p22d;f:q, and this, together with the facts that p2d;f:p ! :q
and :p;:p ! :q2d;f:q (Corollary 1 again) provide a counterexample for the cut rule. However,
(1) By Corollary 1, 2 and 2d;f are identical with respect to consistent premises, and the former is a Tars-
kian consequence relation.
(2) Although 2d;f is not a consequence relation in the usual sense, it does satisfy the weaker conditions in
Deﬁnition 10 below, which guarantee a ‘proper behaviour’ of non-monotonic entailments in the presence
of inconsistency.
Notation 1. Denote by C ¼ C0  C00 that C can be partitioned to two disjoint subtheories C 0 and C00 (i.e.,
C ¼ C0 [ C00 and AtomsðC0Þ \ AtomsðC00Þ ¼ ;).
Deﬁnition 10. A cautious consequence relation is a relation j between multisets of formulae and formulae,
that satisﬁes the following conditions:
cautious reflexivity: if C = C 0  C00 and C 0 is consistent, then Cj w for all w 2 C 0.
cautious monotonicity [34]: if Cj w and Cj /, then C,wj /.
cautious cut [42]: if Cj w and C,wj /, then Cj /.
Proposition 10. For every unbiased pseudo-distance d and monotonic hereditary aggregation function f, 2d;f is a
cautious consequence relation.
Proof. Cautious reﬂexivity follows from Proposition 9. For cautious monotonicity, let C = {c1, . . . ,cn} and
suppose that C2d;fw, C2d;f/, and m 2 D2d;f ðC [ fwgÞ. We show that m 2 D2d;f ðCÞ and since C2d;f/ this implies
that m 2 mod({/}). Indeed, if m 62 D2d;f ðCÞ, there is a valuation l 2 D2d;f ðCÞ so that dd,f(l,C) < dd,f(m,C), i.e.,
f({d(l,c1), . . . ,d(l,cn)}) < f({d(m,c1), . . . ,d(m,cn)}). Also, as C2d;fw, l 2 mod({w}), thus d(l,w) = 0. By these
facts, then,
10 In
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< f ðfdðm; c1Þ; . . . ; dðm; cnÞ; 0gÞ
6 f ðfdðm; c1Þ; . . . ; dðm; cnÞ; dðm;wÞgÞ ¼ dd;f ðm;C [ fwgÞ;a contradiction to m 2 D2d;f ðC [ fwgÞ.
For cautious cut, let again C = {c1, . . . ,cn} and suppose that C2d;fw;C;w2d;f/, and m 2 D2d;f ðCÞ.
We have to show that m 2 mod({/}). Indeed, since m 2 D2d;f ðCÞ, we have that for every l 2 K2,
f ðfdðm; c1Þ; . . . ; dðm; cnÞgÞ 6 f ðfdðl; c1Þ; . . . ; dðl; cnÞgÞ. Moreover, since C2d;fw, m 2 mod({w}), and so
d(m,w) = 0 6 d(l,w). It follows, then, that for every l 2 K2,dd;f ðm;C [ fwgÞ ¼ f ðfdðm; c1Þ; . . . ; dðm; cnÞ; dðm;wÞgÞ
6 f ðfdðl; c1Þ; . . . ; dðl; cnÞ; dðm;wÞgÞ
6 f ðfdðl; c1Þ; . . . ; dðl; cnÞ; dðl;wÞgÞ ¼ dd;f ðl;C [ fwgÞ:Thus, m 2 D2d;f ðC [ fwgÞ, and since C,wj  /, necessarily m 2 mod({/}). h4. Applications
The general form of the distance-based reasoning considered in the previous sections allows us to apply it in
several areas. Below, we demonstrate this in the context of three basic operations in information systems:
repair (Section 4.1), revision (Section 4.2) and merging (Section 4.3).
4.1. Database repair
Deﬁnition 11. A database DB is a pair ðD;CÞ, where D (the database instance) is a ﬁnite set of atoms, and C
(the integrity constraints) is a ﬁnite and consistent set of formulas in L.
The meaning of D is usually determined by the conjunction of its facts, augmented with Reiter’s closed
world assumption [55], stating that each atomic formula that does not appear in D is false:
CWAðDÞ ¼ f:pjp 62 Dg. A database DB ¼ ðD;CÞ is thus associated with the following theory:CDB ¼ D [ CWAðDÞ [ C:10A database ðD;CÞ is consistent if all the integrity constraints are satisﬁed by the database instance, that is:
D [ CWAðDÞ2w for every w ¼2 C. When a database is not consistent, at least one integrity constraint is vio-
lated, and so it is usually required to ‘repair’ the database, i.e., restore its consistency. Clearly, the repaired
database instance should be consistent and at the same time as close as possible to D. This can be formally
described in our framework as follows: given a pseudo-distance d and an aggregation function f, we consider
for every database DB the following set of (most plausible) interpretations:D2d;f ðCDBÞ ¼ fm 2 modðCÞj8l 2 modðCÞ dd;f ðm;D [ CWAðDÞÞ 6 dd;f ðl;D [ CWAðDÞÞg:This deﬁnition is an obvious reproduction of Deﬁnition 4, where K2 is replaced by modðCÞ. The requirement
that the most plausible interpretations of CDB should satisfy C reﬂects the superior position of the integrity
constraints over the facts in D. Again, we denote by DB2d;fw that D2d;f ðCDBÞ  modðfwgÞ.
The deﬁnition above of 2d;f is a conservative extension of the usual notion of database entailment, used for
deﬁning query answering. Indeed, as it is easily veriﬁed, if a database DB is consistent, then
D2d;f ðCDBÞ ¼ modðCDBÞ, so in this case DB2w iﬀ DB2d;fw.
Now we can also represent the concept of consistent query answering [3,4,21] in our framework:case thatL is a ﬁrst-order language it is usual to add to CDB also the unique name axioms and the domain closure axioms (see [1]).
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• w credulously follows from DB if D2d;f ðCDBÞ \ modðfwgÞ 6¼ ; (i.e., w is satisﬁed by somemost plausible inter-
pretation of CDB).
• w conservatively follows from DB if DB2d;fw (i.e., w is satisﬁed by all the most plausible interpretations of
CDB).
Example 4. Let D ¼ fp; rg and C ¼ fp ! qg. Here, CDB ¼ fp; r;:q; p ! qg. When d is the drastic distance
and f is the summation function, D2d;f ðCDBÞ ¼ fm1; m2g, where m1(p) = t, m1(q) = t, m1(r) = t, m2(p) = f,
m2(q) = f, m2(r) = t.
In terms of distance entailments, then, CDB2dU ;Rr but CDB22dU ;Rp and CDB22dU ;R:q:
This can be justiﬁed as follows: there are two optimal ways (in terms of minimal amount of changes inD) of
restoring the consistency of DB: one ‘repair’ is obtained by removing p from the database instance D, and the
other one is obtained by inserting q to D. These repairs support, respectively, the fact that CDB does not entail
p nor :q (although p;:q 2 CDB). Note, also, that in both cases r remains in the database instance. Indeed,
there is no reason to remove r from D, as this will not contribute to the consistency restoration of DB. This
intuitively justiﬁes the fact that for r we do have that CDB2dU ;Rr.
It follows, then, that r conservatively (and so credulously) follows from DB, while p, q, and their
complements, credulously (but not conservatively) follow from DB. The same results are obtained by the
formalisms for querying inconsistent databases, considered e.g. in [3,4,9,10,19,31,35].4.2. Belief revision
A belief revision theory describes how a belief state is obtained by revising a belief state B by some new
information, w (which is not a contradiction). The new belief state, denoted B  w, is usually characterized
by the ‘closest’ worlds to B in which w holds. Clearly, this principle of minimal change is derived by distance
considerations, so it is not surprising that it can be expressed in our framework. Indeed, if we assume that a
belief state is represented by a set of formulas, then given a pseudo-distance d and an aggregation function f,
the most plausible representations of the new belief state may be deﬁned as follows:11 A f
give he
For aD2d;f ðB  wÞ ¼ fm 2 modðwÞj8l 2 modðwÞ dd;f ðm;BÞ 6 dd;f ðl;BÞg: ð1Þ
The revised conclusions of the reasoner may now be represented, again, by a distance entailment:B  w2d;f/ iff D2d;f ðB  wÞ  modðf/gÞ:
2Example 5. The revision operator DdH2 ;R is the same as the one considered by Dalal in [24]. It is well-known
that this operator satisﬁes the AGM postulates [2] of belief revision.
Below we consider some basic postulates of the operator deﬁned in (1).11
Deﬁnition 13. Denote by C1  2C2 that for every w, C12w iﬀ C22w. Similarly, C12d;fC2 denotes that for
every w, C12d;fw iﬀ C22d;fw.
Proposition 11. Let d be an unbiased pseudo-distance, f an aggregation function, B a belief state, and w a non-
contradictory formula in L. Then  satisfies the following postulates:½Succ	 B  w2d;fw:
½Cons	 B  w is consistent:
½Opt	 if B [ fwg is consistent; thenB  w2d;fB [ fwg:
½IS	 if w2w0 then B  w2d;fB  w0:ull analysis of our approach from a belief revision point of view is outside the scope of this paper. In particular, we do not intend to
re an exhaustive list of properties for , but just to mention some of the better known, generally accepted postulates that it satisﬁes.
more detailed analysis see [41, Section 5].
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the ‘‘four basic, undebatable properties of [ﬂat] merging’’. [Succ] means that the revision process succeeds and
the last piece of information is always believed; [Cons] assures that a belief state is always consistent; [Opt]
states that observations are all accepted if they are jointly consistent, and [IS] is the principle of irrelevancy
of syntax.
Proof of Proposition 11. [Succ] holds since D2d;f ðB  wÞ is a subset of mod({w}). [Cons] follows from the facts
that mod({w})5 ; and K2 is ﬁnite (because Atoms is ﬁnite), thus ; 6¼ D2d;f ðB  wÞ  modðfwgÞ. [Opt] follows
from the fact that if B [ fwg is consistent, then D2d;f ðB  wÞ ¼ modðB [ fwgÞ (cf. Proposition 1). Finally, [IS]
holds by the fact that if w  2w 0 then mod({w}) = mod({w 0}), thus D2d;f ðB  wÞ ¼ D2d;f ðB  w0Þ. h
Note 5. The principle of syntax independence ([IS]) cannot be tailored to equivalent belief bases. That is, if
B2B0 and w  2w 0, it is not necessarily true that B  w2d;fB0  w0. To see this, let B ¼ fp; qg and
B0 ¼ fp;:p _ qg. Clearly, B2B0, but B  f:qg 6 2dH2 ;RB0  f:qg. Indeed, let m1(p) = t, m1(q) = f, and
m2(p) = m2(q) = f. Then D
2
dH2 ;RðB  :qÞ ¼ fm1g and D2dH2 ;RðB0  :qÞ ¼ fm1; m2g. Thus, for instance,
B  :q2
dH2 ;R
p, while B0  :q22
dH2 ;R
p. This may be intuitively justiﬁed by the adaptive character of 2
dH2 ;R
(see Section 3). Indeed, in B0, p is connected to q, and the latter becomes unreliable in light of the new data,
:q. Thus, no reliable information about p can be extracted from B0  :q. In B, on the other hand, the infor-
mation about p is not related to q, so the revision by :q does not involve p.4.3. Information integration
Integration of autonomous data-sources under global integrity constraints (see [41]) is also applicable in
our framework. Given n independent data-sources C1, . . . ,Cn and a consistent set of global integrity con-
straints C, the sources should be merged to a theory C that reﬂects the collective information of the local
sources in a coherent way (that is, C2w for every w 2 C). Clearly, the union of the distributed information
might not preserve C, and in such cases the intuitive idea is to minimize the overall distance between C and Ci
(1 6 i 6 n). This can be done by the following straightforward extension of Deﬁnition 4:
Deﬁnition 14. Let C ¼ fC1; . . . ;Cng be a set of n ﬁnite theories inL, d a pseudo-distance function, and f,g two
aggregation functions. For an interpretation m and a theory C, let dd,f(m,C) be the same function as in
Deﬁnition 3. Now, deﬁne:12 He
13 No
takendd;f ;gðm;CÞ ¼ gðfdd;f ðm;C1Þ; . . . ; dd ;f ðm;CnÞgÞ:
The most plausible valuations (with respect to d, f, g) of the integration of the elements in C under the con-
straints in C, are the elements of the following set:D2d;f ;gðC;CÞ ¼ fm 2 modðCÞj8l 2 modðCÞ dd;f ;gðm;CÞ 6 dd;f ;gðl;CÞg:
Information integration is now deﬁnable as a direct extension of Deﬁnition 5:
Deﬁnition 15. C;C2d;f ;gw iﬀ D2d;f ;gðC;CÞ  modðfwgÞ.
Example 6 [41]. Four ﬂat co-owners discuss the construction of a swimming pool (s), a tennis-court (t) and a
private car-park (p). It is also known that any investment in two or more items will increase the rent (r), other-
wise the rent will not be changed. The opinions of the owners are represented by the following data-sources:
C1 = C2 = {s, t,p}, C3 ¼ f:s;:t;:p;:rg, and C4 ¼ ft; p;:rg;12 The impact on the rent may be represented by
the integrity constraint C ¼ fr $ ðs ^ tÞ _ ðs ^ pÞ _ ðt ^ pÞð Þg.13re, q 2 Ci (respectively, :q 2 Ci) denotes that owner i supports (respectively, is against) q.
te that although the opinion of owner 4 violates the integrity constraint (while the solution must preserve the constraint), it is still
into account.
Fig. 2. The models of C and their distances to C (Example 6).
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of the distances to the data-sources (i.e., g = R), while the other minimizes the maximal distance to the sources
(that is, g = max). The models of C and their distances to C ¼ fC1; . . . ;C4g according to both strategies are
given in Fig. 2.
The most plausible interpretations in each merging context are determined by the minimal values in the two
right-most columns. It follows that according to the ﬁrst context m1 is the (unique) most-plausible
interpretation for the merging, thus C;C2
dU ;R;R
s ^ t ^ p, and so the owners decide to build all the three
facilities (and the rent increases). In the other context we have three optimal interpretations, as
D2dU ;R;maxðC;CÞ ¼ fm4; m6; m7g. This implies that only one out of the three facilities will be built, and so the
rent will remain the same.14
The choice of the merging parameters (d, f,g) is frequently determined by the nature of the mediator sys-
tem. For instance, ddU ;R;R poses merging by majority [47]. This means, intuitively, that if a formula follows
from a suﬃciently large amount of sources in C, it will also follow from C.15 This is demonstrated in Exam-
ple 6, where the ﬂat owner represented by C3 has to accept the majority wish, although it is opposed to his
or her own opinion. In contrast, ddU ;R;max is useful in situations where the sources represent competitive par-
ties, and agreement among all the members is necessary for the merging. See [40,41] for detailed discussions
on operators for merging constraint belief-bases and corresponding complexity results. Some interesting
properties of aggregation-based merging operators in the context of social choice theory are discussed in
[51].
5. Extensions to multiple-valued semantics
Our framework can be extended in a natural way to multiple-valued semantics, so that multiple-valued log-
ics are incorporated and new distance functions are introduced. For this, we ﬁrst consider a general setting of
multiple-valued structures and the entailment relations that they induce (Section 5.1), then we consider dis-
tance functions for the multiple-valued setting (Section 5.2). This allows us to deﬁne a family of distance-based
entailments (Section 5.3), which are a conservative extension of the distance-based entailments considered
above for the two-valued semantics. It is also shown that many properties in the two-valued setting are carried
on to the multiple-valued setting.
5.1. Basic multiple-valued entailments
We continue to denote by L a propositional language with a ﬁnite set Atoms of atomic formulas.14 The decision which facility to choose involves further preference criteria. Summation of distances, for instance, prefers m6 and m7 over
m4, hence according to this criterion t and p are preferred over s.
15 Formally, denote by Cn a multiset that consists of n copies of C. Then majority vote means that if C02d;f ;gw, then for every C there is an
n such that C;Cn02d;f ;gw.
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values), O is a set of operations onV that correspond16 to the connectives ofL, and D is a nonempty proper
subset of V.
The set D consists of the designated values of V, i.e., those that represent true assertions. In what follows
we shall assume that V contains at least the classical values t, f, and that t 2 D, f 62 D.
Deﬁnition 17. Let S ¼ hV;O;Di be a multiple-valued structure for L.
(a) A (multiple-valued) valuation m is a function that assigns an element ofV to each atomic formula inL.
Extensions to complex formulas are deﬁned as usual. In what follows we shall sometimes write m =
{p1: x1, . . . ,pn: xn} to denote that m(pi) = xi for i = 1, . . . ,n. The set of valuations onV is denoted by K
V.
(b) A valuation m satisfies a formula w if mðwÞ 2 D.
(c) A valuation m is a model of a multiset C of formulas inL, if m satisﬁes every formula in C. The set of the
models of C in S is denoted by modSðCÞ.
Deﬁnition 18. Let S ¼ hV;O;Di be a multiple-valued structure for a language L. A basic S-entailment is a
relation S between multisets of formulas in L and formulas in L, deﬁned by CSw if every model of C
satisﬁes w.
Example 7. In many cases there is a ‘natural’ lattice ordering of the truth values in V, and so it is usual to
include in O (at least) the basic lattice operations. In such cases, a conjunction inL is associated with the meet,
the disjunction corresponds to the join, and the negation operation is deﬁned according to a negation on the
lattice (which is usually an order reversing involution). In what follows, we shall use these deﬁnitions for the
operators in O. Now, the two-valued structure TWO is deﬁned by the two-valued lattice, and is obtained by
taking V ¼ ft; fg and D ¼ ftg. The corresponding entailment was denoted above by 2. For three-valued
structures we takeV ¼ ft; f;mg, the lattice operators in O are deﬁned with respect to the total order in which
m is the middle element, that is: f < m < t, and D is either {t} or {t,m}. The structure with D ¼ ftg is denoted
here by THREE?. The associated entailment, 3? , corresponds to Kleene’s three-valued logic [39]. The other
three-valued structure, THREE>, corresponds to Priest’s logic LP [52,53].
17 We denote its entailment by 3> .
Note that by diﬀerent choices of the operators in O other three-valued logics are obtained, like weak Kleene
logic, strong Kleene logic, and Łukasiewicz’s logic (see, e.g., [11,33]). In the four-valued case there are usually
two middle elements, denoted here by b (both) and n (neither).18 In this context it is usual to take t and b as the
designated values. The corresponding structure is known as Belnap’s bilattice (see [15,16] as well as [7]), and it
is denoted here by FOUR. The basic entailment of FOUR is denoted by 4. Entailments in whichV is the unit
interval and D ¼ f1g are common in the context of fuzzy logic (see, e.g., [38]). In this context it is usual to
consider diﬀerent kinds of operations on the unit interval (T-norms, T-conorms, residual implications,
etc.), and this is naturally supported in our framework as well. The simplest case is obtained by associating
^ and _ with the meet and the join operators on the unit interval, which in this case are the same as the min-
imum and the maximum functions (respectively), and relating negation to the involutive operator :, deﬁned
for every 0 6 x 6 1 by:x ¼ 1
 x.5.2. Distance functions
The shift to multiple-valued semantics opens the door to many new opportunities for deﬁning the distance
functions under consideration. While in the multiple-valued setting it is possible to apply the same distance
functions as in the two-valued case, e.g., those that are given in Example 1, it is also possible to introduce16 An n-ary operator e} on Vn corresponds to an n-ary connective } of L, if for every m 2 KV and every n formulas w1, . . . ,wn in L,
mð}ðw1; . . . ;wnÞÞ ¼ e}ðmðw1Þ; . . . ; mðwnÞÞ.
17 Also known as J3, RM3, and PAC (see [11,28,56] and chapter IX of [32]).
18 The notations of these elements reﬂect their intuitive meanings as representing conﬂicts (both true and false) and partial information
(neither true nor false).
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tics. For instance, for three-valued logics, such as Kleene’s and Priest’s logics considered above, it is possible to
extend the Hamming distance so that the distance between the extreme elements t and f will be strictly bigger
than the distances between each one of them and the middle element. In this case, t is associated with the value
1, f is associated with 0, and the middle element m corresponds to 1
2
. The generalized Hamming distance is then
deﬁned as follows:dH3ðm; lÞ ¼
X
p2Atoms
jmðpÞ 
 lðpÞj:This function is used, e.g., in [25] as part of the semantics behind its three-valued database integration systems.
For four-valued interpretations there is also a natural generalization of the Hamming distance. The idea
here is that each one of the four truth values is associated with a pair of two-valued components as follows:
t = (1,0), f = (0,1), n = (0,0), b = (1,1). This pairwise representation preserves Belnap’s original four-valued
structure (see [5,6,8]), and so it is a valid rewriting of the truth values. Now, the distance between two values
x = (x1,x2) and y = (y1,y2) in this pairwise representation is given byd4ðx; yÞ ¼ jx1 
 y1j þ jx2 
 y2j
2
;so the graphic representation of d 4 on the four-valued structure is the following:
Now, the generalized Hamming distance between two four-valued interpretations m, l is deﬁned bydH4ðm; lÞ ¼
X
p2Atoms
d4ðmðpÞ; lðpÞÞ:Clearly, this deﬁnition may be applied on any lattice whose elements have a pairwise representation (see [5,6]).
It is not diﬃcult to verify that all the functions deﬁned above satisfy the conditions in Deﬁnition 1. Note
also that, given two interpretations m, l into {t, f}, it holds that dH4ðm; lÞ ¼ dH3ðm; lÞ ¼ dH2ðm; lÞ, thus dH3 and
dH4 are indeed generalizations of the standard Hamming distance.
5.3. Distance-based entailments for multiple-valued semantics
By their deﬁnition, basicS-entailments are monotonic. In addition, some of them are trivial in the presence
of contradictions (e.g., p;:p2q and p;:p3?q), or exclude classically valid rules (e.g., p;:p _ q23>q and
p;:p _ q24q). Common-sense reasoning and human thinking, on the other hand, is frequently non-monotonic
and tolerant to inconsistency. For assuring such properties we consider in what follows distance-based deriv-
atives of the basic entailments. We do so in a way that is completely analogous to our approach in the two-
valued case (cf. Section 2):
Deﬁnition 19. Given a multiple-valued structure S ¼ hV;O;Di, a distance function d on the set KV of V-
valued valuations, and an aggregation function f, the most plausible S-valuations of a theory C (with respect
to d and f) are the elements of the setDSd;f ðCÞ ¼ fm 2 KVj8l 2 KVdd;f ðm;CÞ 6 dd;f ðl;CÞg:
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tion f, let CSd;fw if DSd;f ðCÞ  modSðwÞ. That is, the most plausible S-valuations of the premises satisfy the
conclusion.
Example 8. Consider the three-valued structure S ¼ THREE? in which the middle element is not designated,
and let f = R. Consider now two diﬀerent distance functions for this setting: the standard Hamming distance
dH2 and its three-valued extension dH3 . The most plausible interpretations of C ¼ fp;:pg are diﬀerent with
respect to these two contexts. Indeed,19 ThDTHREE?
dH2 ;R
ðCÞ ¼ ffp : tg; fp : fgg;
DTHREE?
dH3 ;R
ðCÞ ¼ ffp : tg; fp : fg; fp : mgg:Thus, for instance, C3?
dH2 ;R
p _ :p, while C23?
dH3 ;R
p _ :p.19
Next we examine some of the properties of Sd;f . As it turns out, most of the properties of the two-valued
case considered in Section 3 hold also in arbitrary multiple-valued semantics. In what follows, unless otherwise
stated, we ﬁx some multiple-valued structure S ¼ hV;O;Di, a pseudo-distance d on KV, and an aggregation
function f.
Proposition 12. Let C be a theory in L such that modSðCÞ 6¼ ;. Then DSd;f ðCÞ ¼ modSðCÞ.
Proof. The same as the proof of Proposition 1, since that proof relies only on the fact that d is a pseudo-dis-
tance and f is an aggregation function. h
As in the two-valued case, Proposition 12 implies the following result about the relation between basic mul-
tiple-valued entailments and distance-based ones:
Corollary 4. Let C be a theory inL such that modSðCÞ 6¼ ;. Then for every formula w inL, CSw iff CSd;fw.
Note that Corollary 1 immediately follows from Corollary 4 (whenS ¼ TWO), since every classically con-
sistent theory has a model. Another straightforward consequence of Corollary 4 is the following:
Corollary 5. Let L be the standard propositional language, based on the connectives f:;_;^g, and let
S ¼ hV;O;Di be a multiple-valued structure forL in which and there is an element x 2V such that both x and
:x are in D. Then for every multiset C of formulas in L and every formula w in L, CSw iff CSd;fw.
Proof. By induction on the structure of the formulas in L it is easy to verify that if m(p) = x for every atom
p 2 Atoms({w}), then m(w) = x as well. Thus, an S-valuation that assigns x to every atom is a model of every
theory in L. The corollary thus follows from Corollary 4. h
Example 9. Let L be the standard propositional language. Then, for every multiset C of formulas in L and
every formula w in L,
(a) C3>w iﬀ C3>d;fw,
(b) C4w iﬀ C4d;fw.
Indeed, both claims follow from the last corollary, where x is the designated middle element of the relevant
structure (S ¼ THREE> in the ﬁrst case and S ¼ FOUR in the second case).
Non-trivial reasoning is another property that is preserved in the multiple-valued case:
Proposition 13. Let S ¼ hV;O;Di be a multiple-valued structure in which V is finite. Then, for every pseudo-
distance d on KV and for every aggregation function f, the distance-based entailment Sd;f is paraconsistent.is is so since mðp _ :pÞ ¼ m when m(p) = m, and in THREE? the middle element is not designated.
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has a non-empty set of most plausibleS-valuations. It follows, then, that for every formula w such that there
exists a valuation m 2 DSd;f ðCÞ for which mðwÞ 62 D, we have that C2Sd;fw. h
Proposition 14. Let d be an unbiased pseudo-distance on KV and f an aggregation function. Suppose that C is a
theory in L and w is a non-tautological formula in L such that Atoms(C) \ Atoms({w}) = ;. Then C2Sd;fw.
Proof. Similar to that of Proposition 5. h
It is easy to verify that several other properties of 2d;f are satisﬁed in the general case as well. Two such
properties are rationality and adaptivity under unbiased distances and hereditary functions:
Proposition 15. Let d be an unbiased pseudo-distance and f a hereditary aggregation function. If CSd;fw then
C;/Sd;fw for every formula / such that Atoms(C [ {w}) \ Atoms({/}) = ;.
Proposition 16. Let d be an unbiased pseudo-distance and f a hereditary aggregation function. Suppose that C can
be represented as C0 [ C00, where modSðC0Þ 6¼ ; and Atoms(C 0) \ Atoms(C00) = ;. Then for every formula w such
that Atoms({w}) \ Atoms(C00) = ;, it holds that if C0Sw then CSd;fw.
The proofs of Propositions 15 and 16 are completely analogous to those of Propositions 7 and 9, respec-
tively. Similarly, we have the dual result (with a similar proof) of Proposition 8:
Proposition 17. Let d be a pseudo-distance and f an aggregation function. If CSd;fw and modSðC [ f/gÞ 6¼ ;,
then C;/Sd;fw.
Not every property of 2d;f is preserved in the general case, though. Proposition 3 is one example for this.
Another property that is determined by the underlying multiple-valued structure is monotonicity. Indeed, 2d;f
is not monotonic (Proposition 6), but as Example 9 shows, in the standard propositional language 3>d;f and
4d;f are monotonic for every d and f (since they are equivalent to the monotonic consequence relations 3>
and 4, respectively).6. Conclusion
The principle of minimal change is a primary motif in many contexts of reasoning with incomplete and
inconsistent information, such as formalisms for modelling belief revision (e.g., [17,18,26,29,36,37,46,50,59]),
decision making in the context of social choice theory [30,43,44,51], database integration systems
[3,4,9,21,22,47], and operators for merging independent constraint data-sources [40,41]. In this paper,
we introduced a simple and natural framework for representing this principle in an explicit way. It is
shown that the entailment relations that are obtained can be incorporated in a variety of deductive sys-
tems, mediators of distributed databases, consistent query answering engines, and formalisms for belief
revision.
The primary goal of this paper was to consider some of the main logical properties of those distance-
based entailments. It is shown that within our framework it is possible to deﬁne cautious consequence rela-
tions that are paraconsistent (inconsistent information is tolerated in a non-trivial way), non-monotonic
(conclusions may be revised), and obey the law of inertia (irrelevant facts do not aﬀect existing conclusions).
A characteristic property of the underlying entailments is that to a large extent they retain consistency.
Indeed, in a two-valued (respectively, S-valued) semantics, these entailments are identical to the classical
logic entailment (respectively, are identical to the corresponding basic S-entailment), as long as the set
of premises is kept consistent. Moreover, even when the set of premises becomes inconsistent, the conclu-
sions of the fragment of the theory that is not related to the ‘core’ of the inconsistency are the same as those
obtained by the basic entailment of the two-valued (respectively, the S-valued) logic, whenever only this
consistent fragment is taken into account. In contrast to the entailment of classical logic, however, our for-
malisms are not degenerated in the presence of contradictions, so the set of conclusions is not ‘exploded’ in
such cases.
782 O. Arieli / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 48 (2008) 766–783Future work on this subject involves a development of proof systems for automated reasoning with dis-
tance-based considerations, and the incorporation of oﬀ-the-shelf computational tools for practical applica-
tions of distance-based reasoning.
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